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PM: This is Philip Murphy speaking to Professor Ambassador Dubey on 4 
July 2014.  Ambassador, thank you very much for speaking to me.  The 
purpose of the project is to record the views of senior officials, 
diplomats, ministers and people involved in the unofficial 
Commonwealth, on the value of the Commonwealth since the creation 
of the Secretariat in 1965.  You were Foreign Secretary at a very 
interesting time, as so many different things were going on in the world: 
the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the First 
Gulf War.  I’m sure you had much more to think about than the 
Commonwealth, but I’d be very interested in your broader views about 
the role of the Commonwealth and Indian engagement in the 
Commonwealth. In your earlier diplomatic career, before you became 
Foreign Secretary, what were your dealings with the Commonwealth 
and your impressions of the Commonwealth? 
 
MD: I’ll go back to the interview in which I appeared to qualify for the foreign 
service. In those days it used to be the practice that individual interview [was] 
followed by [a] group interview.  So some six or seven candidates would be 
interviewed individually and then together to discuss a particular subject.  So 
in my group the subject they put for discussion was should India leave the 
Commonwealth? 
 
University  of  London 
INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES 
2 
 
[Laughter]. 
 
PM: And in what year was that please? 
 
MD: That was 1957.  So two things that happened created a very negative 
impression in the country about whatever legacy that was left of the British 
Empire and in some quarters the Commonwealth was viewed as a kind of 
carrying forward that legacy.  One was, of course the Suez War, which was 
very fresh in the minds of all of us. It had just happened when we got 
interviewed, and the other one, of course, the Indian balance of payment 
problem and moving away from the sterling balance to managing its own 
reserves and economy. My answer to that question is that I quoted 
Jawaharlal Nehru, and I said that he has said that ‘in this divided world the 
more forums we have of bringing nations together for peace and co-
operation, the better it is for the world and this is one of the reasons why I 
would like India to be in the Commonwealth’, and I quoted that at the 
interview.   And the other argument I gave is that, “The Suez War is not 
something which has been raised by the British people. It has been raised, or 
started by the government that is in power and you should not confuse the 
government that is in power with the nation and the tradition of that nation” 
and I very handsomely quoted Aneurin Bevan in the British Parliament when 
he’d declared the Suez War as Eden’s private war; and he also said in one of 
his speeches in Parliament that England fought a war to save Jenkins’ Ear 
and now we are fighting a war to save Eden’s Face.  
 
[Laughter]. 
 
MD: I quoted all these things in my interview, because I was a very avid reader of 
the New Statesman in those days, to which I used to subscribe as a student 
from the first years of my university days.  So this is how it began, and then, 
of course, I came face to face in dealing with the problems meeting with the 
Commonwealth when I came back to Delhi as Additional Secretary; then I 
became Secretary, then I became Foreign Secretary. One of the things that 
Commonwealth Secretaries were doing very well those days, particularly 
under the leadership of Shridath Ramphal was to anticipate developments in 
the world… you know, to think on behalf of the community of nations, 
anticipate problems and in its own way and from its own vantage position, try 
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to suggest strategies to deal with it. And this it was trying to do through a 
series of very high level groups that were set up from time to time.  To study 
different problematics, global problematics - actually there was an excellent 
report on international monetary policy at about that time. Another group that 
had been set up was on the crisis in the world economy at that time and he 
nominated me as a member of that group, though I was very actively in the 
service and I expressed my reservations about it, but he insisted.  I could not 
attend a single meeting.  The group completed its work and they ask me to go 
through it [and] to sign it and I said “look, even if I agree with that, it would not 
be proper for me to sign it” and I requested them to remove my name from 
those who signed the report and they did that; but that is one way in which I 
was associated.  But at that time I attached and I still attach considerable 
importance to this kind of initiative that was taken: looking at the world from 
the vantage position of this group of countries, analysing it for the benefit for 
the rest of the world and suggesting a strategy; that was done through a 
series of such reports.  I don’t know if the tradition has been kept up until now.   
 
The other thing, of course, was that at the time when I was Foreign Secretary, 
I accompanied Rajiv Gandhi to the Vancouver Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting and there, of course, my role really was to craft his 
speech in consultation with the other people who were assisting him and 
basically, as you very rightly pointed out, that was the time when the Cold 
War was just about to end. Signs of the new era had already appeared 
through a number of developments, particularly in Europe.  The fall of the 
Berlin Wall and all that, and the movement towards democracy had started in 
large parts of the world, because the end of the Cold War coincided with 
some very far reaching agreements on disarmament, the solution of some 
problems which had appeared intractable - El Salvador, Nicaragua, Angola, 
etc. - and this movement was democracy and increasing recognition of 
human rights and democracy of the time.  So basically I crafted his speech 
around that, along with my other colleagues and I remember that.   
 
After that, or may be before that, one of the main emphases in the 
programme of the Commonwealth has been to observe the human rights 
situation, mainly in the Commonwealth countries and outside also.  Now to 
what extent in the individual cases they have been able to take a joint view is 
very difficult to say, because the differences start once you deal with a 
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particular country’s case, but if you deal with it at a global macro-level - 
promote democracy as such, promote human rights as such - then there is a 
good chance of coming together and I think that that was taking place at the 
time and subsequently even the condition for remaining in the 
Commonwealth, condition for hosting important events of the Commonwealth, 
were the conditions that you did not detract in any major way from democratic 
values by your own democratic problems. There was even a kind of a moral 
and legal back-out in the sense that meetings were cancelled… I think that it 
gathered momentum, even started from that time and it continues today, and I 
think that this is an important role which the Commonwealth can play.   
 
I have the feeling that this is not being played energetically - as energetically 
as it used to be done some years ago - perhaps because other factors have 
appeared on the scene and they are competing. For example, the Human 
Rights Commission has become more active after it was converted into the 
Human Rights Commission Council and when it moved from the jurisdiction of 
the Economical Social Council to the General Assembly, because of these 
factors… then you will have these global NGOs in the field of human rights, 
which are  spread larger and which command some authority in the world, 
and they do their own watching, they do their own reporting which influences 
the world.  So there is a great deal more of competition in this area than it 
used to be at that time.  At that time the Commonwealth played a very distinct 
role in that area and I think that there is a case for re-thinking about it and 
seeing how it can be revived. 
 
PM: How do you think that it might be revived?  What would your remedy be 
for the problems at the moment? 
 
MD: I think that there is a lot of confusion in the thinking of groups in different parts 
of the world on what these values are. It can be seen in the Third World 
counties to have dismissed democratic values based on the so-called 
Westminster Model, but finding the model of inter-state relationships on the 
American model without knowing what is going to replace that. I think that the 
fact is that democratic values are universally recognised in the world today. 
They were developed in the Western democracies and from there they got 
universalised.  The roots are in the philosophical thinking of that civilisation 
and in these parts of the world, but as they have been socialised, legalised 
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and universalised today. They are mainly formulated and articulated in the 
Western countries. And so I think there is a need for one initiative - maybe it 
needs to be taken by the Commonwealth - to have an international debate on 
that and have a common ground on that, so that you know what you are 
defending.  Rajapaksa also thinks he is spreading democracy and he has his 
own notion.  In many developed countries [we know] the importance of 
majorities consciously safeguarding the interests of the minority and going out 
of the way to do that: doing a kind of a rapprochement with the minority to 
behave, work and act as though they are one with them.  This is something 
which is not done in most of the democracies in the developing world.   So I 
think many of the norms and some of these principles can be agreed upon 
within the Commonwealth forum and it could be elaborated further to take 
care of some of the very discouraging departures that have been made in Sri 
Lanka or could be made here under this in-coming government.  That could 
be a great service, to my mind. 
 
PM: You mentioned Sri Lanka. What was your view of Manmohan Singh not 
going to the last Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting? 
 
MD: Well, that is basically a question of strategy and diplomacy.  I think that my 
own view is that one should not shun meetings, in spite of the adversity of the 
situation.  That’s the reason why I believe that we should have… the dialogue 
with Pakistan should never have stopped.  I wrote a book two years ago. I 
have a separate chapter on dealing with neighbours and I have said that in no 
circumstances should the dialogue stop and I have given the reason that the 
kind of suspicion that it creates with the small members being give the 
impression of being neglected and insulted, and then suspicion leads to 
counter-action and counter-action could be very, very damaging. All kinds of 
adverse outcomes arise out of this hiatus and I think that even if there is 
something like the attack that happened in Mumbai, no leader should have 
really said that “we are not doing to have the dialogue until you do that”, even 
if you want to say it.  The best thing to say is “we will stop discussions for the 
time being, let things normalise, we will think about that.”  So leadership 
should be visionary and far-seeing, rather than just responding to the people.  
Then there is no difference between an ordinary politician and a statesman, 
and what we need in this world are statesmen, which we used to have from 
time to time in the past. 
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PM: Yes. 
 
[Laughter]. 
 
PM: In terms of India’s relations with its neighbours, do you think the 
Commonwealth networks have been useful in that diplomacy? 
 
MD: Again, I would say that there are rival institutions.  Now, for example, in South 
Asia, one rival is the SAARC, so a forum where you harmonise views and 
take a common view instead of the Commonwealth organising that. It could 
have been done in the absence of SAARC.  It is now being done by SAARC.  
So there is the thing, that other institutions have emerged and it is really very 
important for the Commonwealth to think about what it could have as a USP.  
So two I have pointed out: looking at the world from the perspective of this 
group of countries and making that analysis available to the world and putting 
across the strategy following from that, and the other is what I just said this 
morning.  The third one I would like to say is that what struck me those days 
about the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth’s laudable work was quickly 
filling in the vacuum of enabling developing countries to formulate policies in 
areas where they interacted at an international level, particularly policies in 
UNCTAD and GATT, and the Commonwealth was doing extremely good work 
at that time.  You know that the first institution to make experts available to 
developing countries to analyse the educational implications and formulate 
domestic policy was the Commonwealth and they had some studies 
commissioned, they had experts made available.   
 
I remember that one of my Joint Secretaries, with whom I worked, who was 
an extremely competent officer. He didn’t come from IES, and he was the 
expert in the Commonwealth Secretariat on this issue and he worked for a 
long time, even from India and then from Geneva and he then gave extremely 
valuable service to this to a large number of different countries. So I think that 
that role, of course. UNCTAD had a big programme of spreading 
[development assistance] out, but one should look at that kind of role. One of 
the major issues today which the Commonwealth Secretariat should look at 
today are the FTAs:  FTAs, bilateral FTAs which have proliferated in Asia, 
including a number of convert countries.  In developing countries [it is a 
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question of] regional FTAs and the multilateral FTAs: a job being negotiated 
like TPP and now how TPP or transatlantic would be placed in the 
international trading system. Does it supersede the international trading 
system? What will the consequences? Because basic rules are still there, and 
it’s a very messy area. I think what is the remarkable thing about Ramphal 
was he used to anticipate this and used to take the initiative to study it, and 
that should happen even now, you know.  I’ll tell you an interesting incident. I 
was very actively involved in the negotiations on multilateral economic issues: 
that was my strengthen in the foreign service, so much so that at one stage 
my colleague said that “you are so much on the economic side that you will 
never become the Foreign Secretary.  They will dub you as a one-issue 
person”, but I persisted with that, particularly in the UN system and I saw that 
in my second assignment to Geneva, which was in 1982-85.  I was not able to 
negotiate but the counter-attack on UN activism by the major developing 
countries was because of a variety of factors, one of them being that in their 
own domestic policy, Thatcher and Reagan wanted the state to get off the 
back of the people. The intergovernmental system also became suspect and 
therefore the very serious… I have done very serious negotiations, when I 
was Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and 
I used to go the Geneva in the first UNCTAD.   
 
In the second UNCTAD I became Deputy Secretary and I can write a book on 
just my memories of what I negotiated with great pride and delight, but in my 
second assignment for three years, 1982-85, I could not negotiate anything at 
all.  On the basis of my experience I wrote an article which was published in 
Mainstream.  Mainstream was more prestigious than it is today because the 
editor was an outstanding historian from Oxford, Nikhil Chakravarty. He left 
the Communist Party in 1950 and he started the publication and he still edited 
it.  So that article was published in Mainstream. When I was in Geneva,  I got 
a call from Ramphal from London saying “Muchkund, is really true that you 
are not negotiating anything? The tables have been turned: that it’s 
reversed?”  And I said that “I can tell you numerous examples which I could 
not give in the article because I am still in the government service and I am 
still negotiating”.  So there is the kind of antenna that he used to have in 
different parts of the world. 
 
[Laughter]. 
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PM: I think one of our findings already is how important the personality of 
the Secretary General is in making the Commonwealth work. 
 
MD: Absolutely.  Incidentally, Kamalesh [Sharma] was my Joint Secretary when I 
came here as Additional Secretary, and we did the first evaluation of India’s 
economic assistance to developing countries, mainly neighbouring countries 
and so a very good friend… but you know Ramphal was a class apart, no 
doubt about that. 
 
PM: What was your sense of Ramphal’s successor, Chief Anyaoku? 
 
MD: Anyaoku was a very amiable person. A man who can be relied upon to find a 
compromise.  He would not antagonise.  He would not join issue 
confrontationally, but he would always try to find a way out.  I think that he 
was inherently a compromiser and that is a very good quality.  He had the 
quality to a degree which really marked him out from others and I respected 
him for that; but that doesn’t allow a clash of ideas from which new ideas 
emerge. 
 
PM: A couple of questions just taking you back to 1987 and Vancouver: 
Rajiv Gandhi seems to have been far more enthusiastically engaged 
with the Commonwealth than his mother had been. Would that be a fair 
assessment? 
 
MD: Exactly. I think that one of the reasons was that she was in a period when the 
feelings against the Empire was still there to some extent and then she was 
an imperial Prime Minister, as somebody said, ‘dreaming of her own 
importance’ in the world.  But Rajiv during this period was very interesting, 
because everything was in flux and there were many places where very good 
and important work was being done. There was a ground for taking initiative, 
showing alternative way of doing things, because the old ways were turning 
and he came at that time and he had some advisors and I regard myself as 
one of them.  I think that among all the Prime Ministers that I worked with, I 
worked with him the longest, but not as a Foreign Secretary; I worked with 
him when I was Secretary.  I became Foreign Secretary with V P Singh, but 
he used to keep me engaged and I think some of his most important 
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initiatives have come from me.  I don’t know if anybody has told you that the 
Rajiv Gandhi action plan was written by me. 
 
PM: Yes. 
 
MD: And similarly many other things…[for example] the G15, which he launched in 
Belgrade was drafted by me and the man… This young man was looking for 
initiative. He used to feel dissatisfied when things were not moving, but 
sometimes he wanted to move things for the sake of moving, which proved 
fruitless subsequently; but sometimes if people around him gave him really 
good ideas, he was able to grasp their significance and grab it, and that’s how 
I was able to interact with him. Very, very important. After this Rajiv Gandhi 
action plan, we organised one of the world’s biggest NGO conferences on 
disarmament to sell our action plan in Delhi and it was done entirely by me.  
We got four books out on disarmament at that time, but this is not off the 
record, but I found he suddenly lost interest and that is the time when Bofors 
was indirectly catching up on him.  It was playing heavily on his conscience 
somewhere and I suddenly found him losing interest in the entire initiative. 
 
PM: Were you close to his policy towards Sri Lanka as well? 
 
MD: Very close, but I was closer to that in the time of the V P Singh government, 
because the withdrawal from Sri Lanka was being negotiated by the Joint 
Secretary in the Secretariat, Ronen Sen, who later on became our 
Ambassador in so many places: Bonn, Moscow, Washington and Minister in 
the Sri Lankan government. But there was an ambivalence about the Indian 
position.  They were not very… determined to withdraw.  They wanted to 
extract the price or whatever it is, but when the new government came which 
made me Foreign Secretary, it was a very interesting incident. The new 
Foreign Minister, Mr Gujral, called the three Army Chief[s], the three 
Intelligence Chief[s], [and the] Foreign Secretary at his residence and he had 
not moved to his official residence.  Suddenly he calls me, and I was 
Secretary for International Relations, and he said “You prepare a blueprint for 
withdrawal and post-withdrawal , and we will discuss that.” So that was what 
they wanted to do. So I told him that “Sir, it is very embarrassing because the 
Foreign Secretary is to deal with neighbours, and I am Secretary dealing with 
international organisations. How do you expect me to prepare this thing?”  
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Then he gave me some hint of his desire to make me Foreign Secretary and I 
prepared that note. That began the basis for discussion and decisions how to 
withdraw. When they came to power one of the principal tasks they entrusted 
to me was to bring that negotiation to finality.  When I went in special military 
planes to Colombo three or four times, I negotiated with the gentleman who at 
one time was both Foreign Minister and Defence Minister and he was also 
killed by the LTTE. I basically negotiated with him.  
 
PM: And again, doing back to the Vancouver Heads of Government meeting: 
could you tell me a little bit about your broader impressions of that 
meeting?  How it was run?  The issues?  It coincided with the second 
coup in Fiji. Do you find the CHOGM a useful experience…? 
 
MD: An extremely useful experience, very, and because the things were kind of 
changing or on the verge of major changes and therefore the opportunity for 
Heads of Government to think ahead on what could be the unique 
contribution of this group of leaders and countries to the international order 
that was evolving.  That was the main preoccupation and I applied my mind 
basically to that; that was reflected in a few interventions by the Prime 
Minister and his speech there.  The Fiji thing was very much left to the 
Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State who accompanied him, and he 
handled it in that meeting. 
 
PM: How did relations with the Commonwealth relate to India’s relations with 
Great Britain? 
 
MD: I think that there is a very important relationship in the sense that is enhances 
the chances of working together through the Commonwealth.  And hence the 
importance of the Commonwealth. But if the country which hosts the 
Commonwealth and which is headed by the monarch, if it then continues to 
have a tense relationship with a country like India… and after all, if we have a 
consensus, an understanding, it is the really developed by three or four 
countries which are very active together and these two countries will always 
play a very important role. Therefore good relationships between these two 
countries would be a very important factor in enhancing the stature of the 
Commonwealth and investing it with more important role and getting more 
measured initiatives taken through this forum. 
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PM: What were your relations like with British Foreign Ministers?  Did you 
meet many of the British Foreign Secretaries at the time? 
 
MD: Yes, I had an official visit to the UK when I encountered my counter-part and 
called on the British Foreign Secretary, but I never dealt directly with any 
Foreign Secretary. 
 
PM: Yes, it was the Minister who was dealing? 
 
MD: The Minister.  Then my counter-part came to this part of the world.  He first 
visited Japan, then came to India and I hosted him and I discussed a whole 
host of subjects with him. I remember a very interesting joke he told us. He 
said one of his Ministers was delivering a speech and was being translated by 
a Japanese [translator].  So he would first translate it into Japanese. He 
himself was delivering his speech and then into English and then he was 
introduced as the Permanent Under-Secretary.  He was turned into a “junior 
typist” [by the translator]. 
 
[Laughter]. 
 
PM: How important was it to have senior Indian diplomats within the 
Secretariat in Marlborough House - people like Muni Malhotra, Krishnan 
Srinivasan? Was that helpful in terms of Indian diplomacy, do you 
think? 
 
MD: Yes, very much so, because I think Krish was one of the very few persons 
after he came back here to carry the message of Commonwealth and he 
wrote some very interesting articles on the importance of Commonwealth 
during the subsequent years whenever the occasion arouse.  I still keep in 
touch with him.  He lives in Calcutta and he write prolifically for the Statesman 
and also he has now got three/four books published.  Moni of course went at 
a relatively junior level and he rose to the position, but Krish was already 
senior. He had already served as Foreign Secretary. I think that Krish was the 
best spokesman of the Commonwealth here in this country.  Still is.   
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PM: Yes, and we now have Amitav Banerji as Head of the Political Section as 
well in… 
 
MD: That’s right.   
 
PM: I suppose still at the time of Vancouver and in the late 1980s, the issue 
of South Africa really dominated Commonwealth affairs. Was that 
something in which Indian diplomacy and Rajiv Gandhi took a close 
interest? 
 
MD: Very much actually.  The whole level and extent of assistance to the Front 
Line countries in Africa was raised to a very high level by Rajiv Gandhi and he 
increased the resources made available to help them from something like 5-
10 crore rupees to 100 crore rupees overnight. Subsequently he set up a fund 
for the development and he put the entire foreign service officers, quite 
senior, in charge of that. I think that the entire profile of assistance to the front 
line states, was transformed in Rajiv Gandhi’s time and he was very 
enthusiastic about helping them.  So that must have been reflected in any 
kind of strategy that he adopted and articulated in international forums they 
couldn’t call ‘Commonwealth’. 
 
PM: And do you think the Commonwealth was of assistance in terms of 
India’s relations with African states?  Those Commonwealth networks? 
 
MD: I think so, definitely I think they were of assistance and the Commonwealth 
has played a very important role in the dismantling of Apartheid.  I remember 
that I attended the Independence of Namibia. Mandela had just been 
released a few months before that and he was not yet occupying a position. 
He came to Namibia to be present there and a group of leaders of about 15-
20 called on him and I kind of shepherded the group as the Foreign 
Secretary. The delegation consisted of the top leaders of each different 
political party in India – extreme leftists to extreme rightists - and for all of 
them just his name was so important and this desire to have a glimpse of a 
person like that was so strong in the heart of these people that they all 
wanted to go there. I think that was a big moment. I was present when de 
Klerk made the statement transferring sovereignty to Namibia then and was 
13 
 
present there in the huge open stadium.  It was quite a heady experience 
really and of course the Commonwealth is associated in this whole thing. 
 
PM: And did you meet Mandela in Harare at the time of the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting? 
 
MD: No. But now I’m wondering… I attended one Congress meeting, but was that 
Harare of what?  I don’t remember it, but there was a one where our Prime 
Minister did not go. 
 
PM: Right.  I’d have to check. Just going back to where you started, and your 
exam question: it suggests that  India’s engagement with the 
Commonwealth has always been slightly tentative and uncertain. Do 
you think that’s true?  The fact that withdrawal was even contemplated 
in the mid-1950s? 
 
MD: Well, I do not know whether it was all contemplated at the official level.  I think 
so long as Nehru was there it would never be contemplated; but leaders from 
the opposition would speak about it, which they would be in any circumstance 
or any issue. In this country of diversity you have always opinion against it, 
but that particular moment when I took my exam, the negative factor had 
become very salient.  I think perhaps, if I recall ,the Suez War had become 
the reason for that. 
 
PM: Yes, indeed. 
 
MD: And that’s why the very fact that they selected the subject for group 
discussion. 
 
[Laughter]. 
 
MD: But I think India’s tentative attitude towards the Commonwealth is partly due 
to a variety of factors. It’s a question of priority that among the various 
institutional alternatives available. Do you devote more of your time and 
energy in terms of effectiveness?  Now when it comes to, say, BRICS where 
these countries are developing… when it comes to SAARC, and then of 
course you know that the Non-Aligned Movement was very much there at that 
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time, and that was the main instrument for promoting our foreign policy at the 
time.  So I think that because of these competing conditions… in relative 
terms we attached only so much importance to the Commonwealth, not more.  
This is how I would put it. 
 
PM: Yes, and in terms of other alliances and relationships, how, for example, 
did Soviet diplomats view India’s relationship with the Commonwealth?  
Did they suggest that it compromised your non-aligned status or…? 
 
MD: No, the point of view of the Soviet diplomats took on India’s policy [was] 
towards global issues.  We did not allow them very much to influence our 
foreign policy. 
 
PM: Of course, yes. 
 
MD: They had a presence in Angola.  They had a presence in Cuba, etc. and they 
had great respect for Castro.  I remember that the Declaration of the Non 
Alliance summit in Havana, in 1979 - that was prepared by Cuba.  We played, 
almost single handedly, the role of transforming it into something which 
served our interests directly rather than indulging in ideological politics. 
Paragraph by paragraph it changed, and I played a massive role in that.  So 
that is the thing and I don’t think that at that time the Soviets minded it 
because it didn’t come in the way of the national interest.  Nor did we become 
an ally or camp follower in these things that they were doing.  So I don’t think 
that they regarded the Commonwealth as another design or instrument of the 
imperial power to participate the world order, because they were very much in 
favour of the world order that they wanted.  They also had views which didn’t 
coincide with ours in many respects, so India, though there is the impression 
that non-alignment actually meant pro-Soviet; but to some extent there could 
be some issues on which our views converged and we took the position, but 
by and large it was really independent. 
 
PM: Of course, yes.  Just one final question. Again, thinking of it from the 
Indian perspective, you could suggest that the Commonwealth is really 
doomed because of a generational phenomenon, that you had the first 
wave of independence leaders – Nehru, and then later Nkrumah and 
Nyerere. Nehru, of course went to a British public school and felt very 
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comfortable in that milieu.  African leaders had been educated in the 
British system and felt those links quite personally in a way that later 
generations didn’t, of course.  I suppose there’s a view that that is 
bound to lead to a gradual loosening of that Commonwealth bond and 
perhaps its eventual disappearance. What do you feel about that? 
 
MD: I think that how the continuation of the Commonwealth and it’s becoming 
more vigorous and active would very much depend upon factors other than 
their common bonds that you very rightly pointed out.  Secondly, I think that 
there should be a real desire on the part of the leadership of the UK to make it 
function. 
 
PM: That’s interesting. 
 
MD: In my mind there is a question that, is the UK now much more interested in 
other institutions which have come up and which it is playing a part than in the 
Commonwealth? 
 
PM: Indeed. 
 
MD: I mean, the whole thing of EU and other institutions that have been set up. 
 
PM: So the feeling that the UK has neglected the Commonwealth? 
 
MD: That’s right, and the kind of leadership that is in the UK, there should be a 
consensus in the political circles that this institution is playing a very important 
role.  That this institution has unique features and contributions to make, and 
one should work together in this thing and give it the salience and attention 
that it deserves.  That’s very important, I think because the leadership for the 
last few years in the UK seems to me has given a preference to playing its 
role elsewhere more than in the Commonwealth.  So I think, basically, the two 
or three areas that we identified.  If some thinking is given to these and 
strategy devised, that could infuse new life into the whole thing. 
 
PM: Yes, but essentially as a diplomatic resource rather than something 
connecting non-official organisation, you think? There are 
Commonwealth based organisations which are not part of the official 
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Commonwealth and I suppose there’s a distinction to be made between 
the diplomatic network and the uses that could be made of that, and the 
kind of popular identification of the Commonwealth across 
Commonwealth countries, which seems at the moment to be quite weak 
and weakening further. If you talk to young people in Commonwealth 
countries, mostly they’ll say “what is that?” or “it doesn’t mean 
anything to us at all”. 
 
MD: I think that the latter, giving the Commonwealth a fraternity in functional and 
professional, non-governmental function, and the official arena is really the 
reflection of the former.  The stronger the economy is the more dynamic it 
appears, the more active it appears, the more the professional and functional 
groups want to revolve around it. You have the same thing in SAARC. When 
SAARC was established we had numerous professional organisations trying 
to associate themselves with it; lawyers, chamber of commerce, etc., etc.  
Now it has faded out. SAARC is stagnating and one doesn’t see much 
dynamism in that.  Even if there are reasonable institutions tactically in the 
area, now because they’ve found none of them were functioning, one of the 
tasks was how to reduce them; but our problem here is basically the political 
differences and there the problem is something different. 
 
PM: Thank you very much indeed.  This has been a wonderful interview. 
 
 
 
